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THE 1984 GEORGE ELIOT MEMORIAL LECTURE: 
LOVE, KNOWLEDGE AND NARRATION: 
GEORGE ELIOT ON OTHER MINDS 
By Dr. Richard Freildman B. A. Brandei s; 
D. Phil. Oxon. of the University of Western 
Australia. 
I 
'I t was by loving them ... that he knew them; it was 
not by knowing them that he loved'1 - such was 
Henry lames's legendary conclusion about Balzac 
and his characters. lames's point was simple but 
important: Balzac was, in his view, able to invest 
his characters with a special freedom and 
opaqueness because he loved them as one might love 
.another person ~ They didn't spring complete and 
transparent from a fictional blueprint. 2 
James makes a similar point about Trollope, a 
writer in whom he elsewhere finds fault. If 
Trollope 'was a knowing psychologist, he was so 
by grace; he was just and true without apparatus' 
and without effort'.3 Creation 'without apparatus' 
again suggests an understanding that is intuitive 
rather than calculating; an almost inadvertent, 
instinctive feeling for the veiled inner worlds of 
persons, both in fiction and in life. This is high 
praise indeed from a writer who counted himself 
among the select group of 'loving' creators of 
fictional character. 4 
lames was, of course, also one of the early and 
. great critics of George Eliot. He met her, reviewed 
almost everything she wrote, and learnt a great deal 
about 'the art of fiction' from her work. Yet some 
of his best-known judgements about her art are 
ambivalent or even openly critical. He suggests, 
for instance, that she tended to work 
unspontaneously from 'the abstract to the concrete' , 
and that the instinct for the 'irresponsible plastic'S 
creation of character was less prominent in her 
than in Balzac, Trollope, Turgenev and others. 
She depended too little on love; too much on her 
formidable powers of abstraction and moral analysis. 
Over recent decades George Eliot criticism has 
taken the terms of James's strictures and turned 
them to George Eliot's advantage. Some of the best 
work - passages in Leavis, the extended studies by 
Barbara Hardy, W. J. Harvey and Gillian Beer6 
have demonstrated not only that analysis in an Eliot 
novel is often profoundly creative, but that her 
creation of character is a much less homogeneous 
and ponderous thing than James supposed. 
I don't intend or need to press this particular point 
here. Rather, I wish to recall the related point 
that was the subject of my 1984 George Eliot 
Memorial Lecture, "George Eliot on Love and 
Knowledge". There I argued that an explicit and 
often urgent concern with the proprieties of love 
and knowledge marks a great deal of George Eliot's 
writings; indeed, that it extends beyond her novels 
to her short fiction, essays, reviews and letters. 
This concern is in some instances 'literary' and is 
reminiscent of James's remark about Balzac; but it 
is also often more than literary and reflects certain 
fears on George Eliot's part about human 
relationships. I s it right to seek to know another 
person completely? I s it feasible so to know 
someone? Where does one draw the line between 
loving intimacy and a kind of manipulative expertise 
in the inner lives of others? In a remarkable short 
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story published in 1859 George Eliot was to liken 
such intrusions to the lifting of a veil. But, as her 
early letters indicate, the theme was long in 
preparation. 
1I 
A letter written home by the young Marian Evans 
during a stay with friends in Geneva draws an 
important distinction. She writes of her hosts that 
I feel they are my friends - without 
entering into or even knowing the 
greater part of my views, they 
understand my character, and have 
a real interest in me. (G. E. L., 1/328) 
'Real interest' - a genuine and solicitous concern for 
other people - is implicitly contrasted with what in 
another letter she calls 'hard curiosity': 'I hate hard 
curiosity' (G. E.L., I I 1/376) she insists in objection 
to an unloving and intrusive attitude to the knowledge 
of others. Significantly, the theme surfaces again 
in a statement of authorial intent. She wishes to 
write 
something that would contribute to 
heighten men's reverence before the 
secretsof each other's souls, that 
there might be less assumption of 
entire knowingness, as a datum from 
which inferences are to be drawn. 
(G.E.L., 1I1/164) 
'Entire knowingness' is a parallel term for 'hard 
curiosity': 'inferences', she argues, must to a great 
extent be instinctive if they are to honour the dignity 
of another person. (I shall discuss some of the 
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philosophical implications of this claim presently.) 
The novels make the same point on many occasions. 
Adam Bede insists that 'the human soul is a very 
complex thing' (I :XVI :259) and that we need to strike 
a balance between the moral necessities of at least ' 
partial understanding and the individual's right to a 
margin of privacy. The Mill on the Floss picks up 
on what the letter cited above calls 'knowingness'. 
The narrator observes that 
there is nothing more widely misleading 
than sagacity if it happens to get on a 
wrong scent; and sagacity, persuaded 
that men usually act and speak from 
distinct motives, with a consciously 
proposed end in view, is certain to 
waste its energies on imaginary game. 
(p. 22). 
The passage is important not only in the obvious 
sense that it implies a certain impropriety in 
intrusi ve enquiry, but because it gives George 
Eliot's customary view on what the philosophers 
(Anglo-American rather than Continental) call 
'intention'. Her writing rests. on the assumption 
that 0ther people's 'motives' are obscure and beyond 
total reconstruction, but that they are not thereby 
wholly indeterminate or entirely resistant to humane 
understanding. As we shall see, George Eliot was 
not 'doing' what is now called among critics 
'deconstruction'. However, she was insisting that 
unders'tanding be humane, and that this entails a 
preparedness rlot to know certain things in 
reJationships of love. Thus Philip Wakem in The 
Mill: "I think there are stores laid up in our human 
nature that our understandings can make no complete 
inventory of" (p. 268). Romola takes a similar - if 
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at times inconsistent - line on what it calls 'the 
complexities in human things' (1 I:LI I :236}. Of the 
tragically complex Savonarola the narrator observes: 
The mysteries of human character 
have seldom been presented in ·a 
way more fitted to check the judgements 
of facile knowingness than in Girolamo 
Savonarola; but we can give him a 
reverence that needs no shutting of the 
eyes to fact, if we regard his life as a 
drama in which there were great inward 
modifications accompanying the outward 
changes. (I:XXV:359) . 
Once again, the point is that one must steer a course 
between shallow and insulting 'knowingness' on the 
one hand, and the negligence of not asking certain 
tough questions that are necessary to ethical social 
life, on the other. The first. of these alternatives 
expl-ains the centrality of the word 'reverence' in 
George Eliot's moral vocabulary, for reverence (she 
hoped) allays the temptations of 'facile knowingness'. 
Felix Holt is typical in contrasting reverence and its 
synonyms with the language of unfeeling intrusiveness. 
Thus Rufus Lyon joins the narrator in finding . 
'curiosity' anathema. Lyon shrinks 'even from an 
inward enquiry that was too curious' (p.359) and will 
not defer to 'the insufferable motive of curiosity' 
(p. 399) in others. Not surprisingly, the most 
searching and mom~ntous treatments of love and 
knowledge come in the masterworks, Middlemarch 
and Daniel Deronda. Middlemarch seems (as 
Dr. Johnson put it) to find an echo in almost every 
bosom, not least that of the poststructuralist critics 
who seek evidence in literature for their seemingly 
limitless linguistic scepticism. Middlemarch obliges 
with a characteristic Eliotean stress on the 
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'difficulty' and 'complexity' of human affairs and on 
the dynamic and fluid propensities of the self. 
'Character', it asserts, 'is a process and an 
unfolding' (I:II :226). But poststructuralists like 
J. Hillis-Miller perhaps understate the extent to 
which Middlemarch assumes, and indeed illustrates, 
that other selves are available to a certain - albeit 
a provisional and incomplete - kind of knowing. 7 
George Eliot's general position is classically given 
in Book I I. Dorothea, having like all people been 
'born in moral stupidity', has to acknowledge that 
Casaubon is not the man of her imaginings; not simply 
the embodied image of her adolescent fantasy life. 
She has to 'conceive' that her inadequate husband 
has 'an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights 
and shadows must always fall with a certain 
difference' (I :XXI :323). This passage has been 
variously interpreted but I take it to mean that the 
otherness of other people is a relatively stable 
feature of moral relationships and that it can be 
mitigated by the kind of provisional, respectful and 
cumulative intimacy that characterise relationships 
of love. 'Difference', in this view, is not what it so 
often becomes in structuralist and post structuralist 
discussion - the touchstone of the anti-humanist 
denial of the substantial self - but rather the 
condition of creative human relationships. George 
Eliot was not so naIve as to think such relationships 
wholly unmediated by social convention. On the 
contrary, her novels. essays and letters suggest that 
various codes (linguistic, ethical, religious, 
aesthetic) provide relatively stable contexts within 
which people can make partial sense of one another. 
But - and this is central to her work - such codes 
do not as it were exhaust the individual. Something 
'spiritual' goes on within and between people in 
relationships of love, and neither they nor we can 
entirely explain this. That such an assumption 
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strikes some contemporary readers as philosophically 
unsophisticated need not automatically invalidate it. 
Experience - philosophical and other - suggests that 
it is hard to picture rational, ethical societies without 
in the first instance taking something like this image 
of self for granted. 
George Eliot's last novel, Daniel Deronda, further 
submits the 'equivalent centre of self' to a searching 
spiritual, philosophical and moral investigation. 
Daniel, for example, is another character of tact and 
reverence. He possesses a 'reverential tenderness' 
Cl I I:Ll: 135) towards other people and, in a phrase 
reminiscent of Rufus Lyon, wonders whether he should 
'obtrude his interest' (I :XVI I :280) upon Mirah Cohen. 
Deronda indeed is the unimpeachable - if at times 
somewhat implausible - summation of George Eliot's 
doctrine of unintrusive love. He has the kind of 
knowledge, of other people that J ames imputes to Balzac 
as a creator of character. 
III 
This doctrine, of course, has deep roots in George 
Eliot's life and personality . Those familiar with the 
biographies will know the suffering and internal 
conflict that gave rise to one of the great declamatory 
phrases of Middlemarch's narrative commentary: 'the 
terrible stringency of human need' Cl I :XLVI I 1:313) 
was a thing this immensely complex arid intense woman 
knew at first hand. For her human relationships 
were invariably the central feature of both life and 
fiction; and her novels reflect her personal struggle 
to reconcile 'need'- the t,emptation to claim and know 
another person completely - and the contrasting call 
to solicitude, reverence, unintrusive acceptance. 
I.ndeed, the creative tension that so distinguishes her 
work perhaps resides in her having known, with equal 
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intensity, the horror of solitude and the temptation 
of a total knowingness. And here her extraordinary-
and in some ways aberrant - short story "The Lifted 
Veil" assumes great importance. 
"The Lifted Veil" is about an intensely needy man who 
is cursed with a capacity for total and intrusive 
knowledge. I ts 'hero', Latimer, finds that he can 
both see into . the future and into the minds of other 
people. This nightmare of knowingness compels a 
'diseased participation in other people's 
consciousness' (301), a 'curse of insight' (340) and, 
in what must surely be one of the most momentous 
phrases in all of George Eliot's writings, a sense 
of the 'fatiguing obviousness' of 'other minds' (319). 
Such 'obviousness' is a gothic inversion of 
'reverence', 'love', 'delicacy' and solicitude - the 
touchstones of George Eliot's fictional humanism. 
I t portends a kind of category collapse in which a 
great writer is in effect asking what the world would 
be like if the things she held to be true were in fact 
an insipid and systematic idealisation of t~e real 
state of things. The temptation to call this 
'deconstruction' should however be resisted. "The 
Lifted Veil" is an appalled act of self-criticism and 
examination, but it is everywhere shaped by an 
urgent and fundamentally coherent artistic intention. 
Perha ps one further detail of the story's rather 
tortured plot is pertinent here. Thus blighted, 
Latimer chooses to marry the one person into whose 
mind he does not have the horrific power of 
involuntary psychic access. Bertha is at first his 
salvation, the 'oasis of mystery in the dreary desert 
of knowledge' (301). Eventually, however, the veil 
lifts on her mind also. What is revealed is the gothic 
inversion of love: a malign and trivial calculator who 
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actually seeks her husband's death. 
Why should George Uiot write such a thing? 
There were no doubt many reasons, some 
psychological (her complex feelings about 
relationships); othersdrcumstantial (the story 
was written at the peak of the embarrassment, 
humiliation and insecurity surrounding her 
pseudonym). But a furth~r (and related) one may 
again connect with the personal and artistic 
insecurity that threads its way through her letters. 
I n a particularly striking one of these she writes 
that 'I fear authors must submit to be something of 
monsters not quite simple healthy human beings' 
(G. E. L. II 1/119). At his most troubled, 
Henry J ames sometimes envisaged the novelist as a 
kind of 'monster' in a moral world. What, after all, 
is omniscient narration but an intrusion upon other -
albeit created - minds? "The Lifted Veil" seems to 
look guiltily forward to James on Balzac; but it 
seems also to reflect a troubled region of George 
Eliot's own life. It is surely significant that she 
complained to Herbert Spencer of precisely the 
'double consciousness,Bshe attributes to Latimer. 
Like a novelist Latimer is a man conflicted by a 
special kind of consciousness: he knows all about 
the people he would in many respects prefer to 
leave in a loving obscurity. Here George Eliot's 
legendary psychological realism begins to seem a 
less secure thing than is often thought. This was, 
after all, a form of narration which encouraged her 
to render transparent the mystery she believed to 
reside in other people. Her great novels are a 
creative response to the problem of knowledge in 
life and in narrative art. The letters and "The 
Lifted Veil" reveal the extent and the urgency of 
this, one of fictional humanism's perennial concerns. 
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argument for the liberal humanist position. 
John Bayley's The Characters of Love: A Study 
in the Literature of Personality (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 1960) gives the Jamesian view cited 
above in greater detail than James ever attempted. 
3. Henry James, Partial Portraits (London and New 
York: Macmillan, 1888), p. 105. 
4. See his Preface to The Portrait of a Lady in 
which he describes the way characters presented 
themselves to his imagination. The Preface is 
reprinted in The Art of the Novel, ed. 
Richard Blackmur (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934). 
5. Partial Portraits, p. 51. 
6. F. R. Leavi s, The Great Tradition (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1948); Barbara Hardy, The 
Novels of Geor e Eliot: A Stud in Form--
(London: Athlone Press, 19 3 ; W. J. Harvey, 
The Art of George Eliot (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1961); Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots: 
Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, Geor e 
Eliot and Nineteenth-Centurs Fiction London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 19 3). 
7. See especially two of Hillis-Miller's essays on 
Middlemarch : "Narrative and History", ELH, 
Vol. 41 (Fall 1974) pp 455-73, and "Optic and 
Semiotic in Middlemarch" in The Worlds of 
Victorian Fiction, ed. J erome H. Buckley 
(Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1975). 
This deconstructive view of the self in fiction 
might be contrasted with two important works that 
propose a theory of the self as a narrative unity: 
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Barbara Hardy, Tellers and Listeners: The 
Narrative Imagination (London: Athlone Press, 
1975), and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: 
A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 
1981). 
8. Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography, 2 Vols. 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1904), 
Vol. 1, p.459. 
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